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Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
Time: 1:34 am
Time: 1:34 am
Results for urban guerrillas
1 results foundAuthor: Souza Pinheiro, Alvaro de Title: Irregular Warfare: Brazil's Fight Against Criminal Urban Guerrillas Summary: This monograph by Major General Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro contributes to the discussion of urban guerrillas, their impact on society, and the role of the armed forces in countering criminal elements. The rise of urban guerrillas is a result of an evolution in command and control capabilities, weapons, and doctrine that has given them strong influence over the daily lives of citizens living in neighborhoods where government support and control is limited or absent. The favelas (ghettos, slums) of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo are ready examples that provide the setting for General Alvaro's monograph. The urban guerrilla, however, is emblematic of a wider-felt problem, not limited to Brazil. What makes General Alvaro's monograph compelling is that this Brazilian story has universal application in many locales that are under-governed and under-supported by constituted authorities. Urban guerrillas flow from a witch's brew of ersatz political doctrine, readily available and powerful weapons, and criminal gangs that typically are financed by the drug trade. Criminal groups like the Red Command (Comando Vermelho-CV) and Third Command have been able to thrive in the favelas because of ineffective policing and lack of government interest. These Brazilian gangs have filled the void with their own form of governance. As General Alvaro indicates herein, criminal urban guerrillas have latched on to revolutionary doctrine, such as the Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla and the First Capital Command Statute, so as to give political legitimacy to their lawlessness. In fact, these are gangs that terrorize the residents of the favelas, holding them hostage to criminal exploits, while keeping government legitimacy and security in check. As in the United States, when the general welfare of civil society is at risk, the President may call upon the armed forces to aid the police or take control. Under the Brazilian Constitution the President can "intervene -- to put an end to serious jeopardy to public order --" through his power to "decree and enforce federal intervention." This is akin to the U.S. President's authorities for civil disturbances and other emergencies, but a notable difference is the expansive role that Brazilian armed forces can take. Under the Brazilian Constitution the armed forces "are intended for the defense of the Country, for the guarantee of the constitutional powers [legislative, executive, judicial], and, on the initiative of any of these, of law and order." Thus during the crisis to restore public order in Rio de Janeiro in November 1994 through January 1995, the military was put in charge as the lead agency, with operational control over federal and state police. With Presidential authorization, the Brazilian Minister of the Army designated the Eastern Military Commander as the General Commander of Operations. Operation Rio commenced with the goals of reducing urban violence and reestablishing government authority. Operations consisted of isolating lawless areas, conducting squad patrols and large sweeps, and on several occasions, attacking the urban guerrilla directly. The operation suppressed urban guerrilla activity-for a time. There was a decrease in bank robberies, car thefts, gang shootouts, drug trafficking and weapons smuggling, plus some 300 automatic rifles and 500 hand guns were confiscated. Yet as General Alvaro illustrates in this monograph, the problem persists today with similar public order crises in Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, and other cities. It is for good reason that General Alvaro includes in this monograph a translation of Carlos Marighella's Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla, since the man and his manual continue to inspire miscreants and would-be revolutionary groups. Much as psychiatrist-philosopher Frantz Fanon provided a rationale for African anticolonialists to kill the white interlopers, Marighella is a symbol for ideological activists who would resist authority, as well as for criminals who profit when government presence and legitimacy are wanting. The military planner and strategist should be familiar with the Minimanual and similar writings since they contribute to the development of the strategic environment as we find it, and it is against this backdrop that we plan for countering insurgencies and terrorism. The military will continue to play an important part in countering the urban guerrilla, whose goal is to separate the population from the government (typically by making government forces overreact) then supplanting it. This suggests that the military will need to conduct a range of irregular warfare activities in coordination with civilian agencies. Whatever the combination of direct and indirect actions that are applied to counter the urban guerrilla, the military planner will be well served to consider General Alvaro's insights about Brazil's Fight Against Criminal Urban Guerrillas. Details: Hurlburt Field, FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2009. 98p. Source: Internet Resource: JSOU Report 09-8: Accessed March 12, 2016 at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2009/0909_jsou-report-09-8.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Brazil URL: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2009/0909_jsou-report-09-8.pdf Shelf Number: 138195 Keywords: Criminal NetworksDrug TraffickingFavelasGangsOrganized CrimeUrban GuerrillasUrban ViolenceViolent CrimeWeapons Smuggling |